So every once in awhile I like to make a long ass post about my current view of morality and meta ethics in response to how I've been vetting myself in the public forum(youtube, school, etc.). My last post about this particular topic appears to be...extremely old, and I can't seem to find it. But I know my original script and I'll add a spoiler containing my last post about morality(Which concerns why I feel theistic morality is dead, and why I feel morality itself has become a bit of a science).
Hey guys. BigLundi here with a special announcement on objective morality.
Before I begin, for the purposes of this post, the God being referred to is Yahweh. The Christian idea of god.
As an atheist, when I was younger, I was tempted to, and in fact did for a short time, reject the idea of objective morality. Why is this? Well because for the entire time that I've been around religious people, religion likes to claim some sort of monopoly on objective morality, and indeed the argument is made that if objective morality exists, there must be a source of said morality, and that source could only be God.
In this post, I'm going to explain why this idea is wrong, and why I, as an atheist, can have an objective morality, acknowledge an objective morality, and why said objective morality actualy goes AGAINST the idea of a God being the source.
Firstly, how can an atheist have objective moral values? I've had debates with other atheists on the subject, and to be honest, it's a combination of subjectivity...and objectivity. This seems odd, I know, but please let me explain. I define something to be morally good if it depletes the unnecessary suffering of others and promotes the well being of the same people. Someone who views morality as subjective might say, "But that's just a subjective idea of morality." Well...yeah. There is no correct and incorrect definition to have for morality, there's just what we place value on. I place value on what is objectively good, or rather, what objectively promotes the well being of others and depletes the unnecessary suffering of others.
However the objective part comes from what is suffering and what is beneficial. I mean, it's objectively true that owning another person as a slave causes unnecessary harm and doesn't promote the well being of others. It's objectivey true that murder is detrimental to society and most certainly doesn't promote the well being of others, rape too. These are things that, under my definition(and I contend most people's definitions) are objectively morally wrong.
So I've gotten over the path of GETTING to an objective morality, but...WHY did I chose to define Morality in this way? Well it's simple, whenever you're asked the question "Is that moral?" You should also be asking the follow up of "Why or why not?" Most of us would look at murder and rape and stealing as being morally wrong, but my goal was to define morality in a way to explain WHY these things are morally wrong. So you see all things that we have that are against the law, all things that we instinctualy feel are wrong fall under the definition I've given.
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Next, I'd like to address the argument that if an objective morality exists, then clearly, god must be the source for this morality. Well...that's...self defeating. There are in fact so many problems with this argument. However, I'm only going to address for now, a couple of them, as they directly correlate with my own ideas of morality.
Now, what is moral, under the theistic mindset of God being the source? Well, to address this we look to the Euthyphro Dilemma, which is as follows.
1. Is what is moraly right, morally right because god says it is?
2. Is what is morally right, morally right, and God is simply pointing it out?
Now of course, neither answer really helps the theist's problem. If we go with option 1, then what is morally right is simply an arbitrary definition of 'whatever God says is right'. therefore, if God were to say, perhaps, that murder is ok, then murder just simply becomes ok. This offers a meaningless tautology that whatever god says is morally good, even if we don't find these things to be good.
If we go with option 2, then the use of God as far as morals go, becomes completely wiped out.
However, most apologists have come up with a third answer.
Neither, what is morally right is whatever reflects God's eternal unchanging nature. God's nature, is what is morally right, and things we see as being morally wrong, are simply things that are not in his nature.
2 problems with that.
Firstly, Is murder wrong? Well duh, murder's wrong. For the purposes of this post, we'll define murder as "Intentionally terminating the life of another human being without consent." Consent, btw, can include having given up their right to life, say by attacking you, or having already murdered someone else. Well why is it wrong? Well as the apologist says, "It's wrong because murder does not reflect the eternal unchanging nature of...god...uh oh...see now we have a problem. Anyone who's read the bible understands that God's nature is, most certainly that of allowing murder in many many cases. He commanded it on a regular basis and even accepts human sacrifice. So clearly that...can't be the reason. What CAN be the case, if we want to be consistant with the apologist explanation of morality and god, is we can say that clearly murder, or rather, the intentional termination of human life without consent, does in fact reflect God's nature. Remember my post about how Logic works? IF you don't, look it up real quick, then come back, becasue I'm gonna do a little syllogism to illustrate my point.
1. Actions consistent with god's nature are moral, while actions inconsistant with god's nature are immoral.
2. God's actions are always consistent with God's nature.
3. (from 1 and 2) God's actions are always moral.
4. God performs the act of intentionally terminating the lives of human beings without their consent.
Conclusion: From 3 and 4, it is then moral to intentionally terminate the life of a human being without their consent.
Now, while most of us look at that and see the flaw, a christian might be tempted to make the argument, "Morality is such that intentionally terminating the life of a human being without their consent is moral when performed by god, but immoral when performed by us."...For...whatever bullshit reason.
And you know what That's fine, that's a perfectly legitimate way...to cop out. But it's not without its consequences. See, it then follows from THAT argument that neither God's actions, nor god's nature are TRULY the standard for what is objectively moral. See, if intentionally terminating the life of a human being without their consent is morally wrong, and clearly it is, then...why...is it moraly wrong, if it's not morally wrong for GOD to do so?
The SECOND problem wit hthe aplogetic response to the Euthyphro Dilemma is that saying Morality is reflected by God's nature...doesn't...answer...the question. It just puts the question in seperate terms. It just makes the dilemma more interesting. Does God's nature, for instance, include honesty? Then we simply re word the question.
1. Is honesty right?
2. Is honesty right, because god's nature is honest?
To say that God's nature is honesty just because honesty is morally better than dishonesty certainly doesn't answer the question, and any 4 year old could destroy that answer just by having the capacity to ask, "Why?"
Why is honesty morally better than dishonesty? "Well because honesty reflects God's nature whereas dishonesty doesn't." Right, but why is god's nature one of honesty and not dishonesty? "Well because honesty is morally better than dishonesty." And why is honesty morally better than dishonesty? "Because honesty reflects God's nature whereas dishonesty does not."
Circular reasoning...is circular. Get out of the merry go round, view morality not as simply a question of God, but a question of why.
Thanks for reading.
Now then. An issue that seems to repeatedly come up when it comes to MY version of morality, that a subjective value and definition of morality can result in objectivity concerning 'oughtness' seems to be a point of contention among people that I present this with, and I'd like to address it.
This grows from an extreme loyalty to a misconception about David Hume.
Anyone who's been engaged in the conversation about morality has heard David Hume's Is/Ought gap. That methodological naturalism when applied to investigating the universe can tell us what IS the case about the universe, but it cannot tell us what ought be the case. A prescriptive normative fact cannot come from a descriptive fact, in essence.
However, while this is true, It should never be misconstrued that Hume was a complete subjectivist concerning morality. This gap was simply an observation on his part. There's nothing to indicate(and indeed his literature seems to indicate the opposite) that he didn't believe that normative facts can be derived from presumed moral value X.
This is where the point of contention generally stems. I'll address the main concerns here, and see if I can't satisfyingly address the problems people bring up.
1. "Presuming moral value X is still only your subjective preference and opinion."
My response to this is...so what?
Presuming a subjective value X does not negate the proposition that an objective ought Y can be derived from it. To say that the subjective value renders the entirety of any moral statement or action I can say or do subjective, is a fallacy of composition.
To illustrate this problem I'd like to draw an analogy to a jet and a jet engine.
For the purposes of this analogy the Jet will be the entirety of a philosophical meta ethic, and the jet engine will be the values that drive it, and the characteristic of 'flight' is objectivity. Now, a jet engine cannot fly, on its own. The fallacy being made, however, is extending this lack of ability to fly to the entirety of the jet.
To make the illustration a little more clear, I'll break down the structure of a moral statement, and explain where subjectivity and objectivity come into play:
If I value human life, I ought not murder.
^ subjective value ^ objective logical conclusion.
This brings me to the second contention with my view on morality.
2. "Well, why ought we value X? You can't objectively say what we ought value."
Certainly I can't tell you what you objectively ought to value. But I CAN make an appeal to a common need for society in creating at the very least, a basis for moral values. All societies require certain things to survive, for instance, so then these would be some things to value, in order to continue society, and the only people that would reject these values would be people who do not find survival, valuable.
You might then make the argument: "Then why should I value survival?" Well, I would argue that survival is objectively valuABLE, and that's all that's necessary to concede that you should value it. Because it's capable of being valued, and there's no valid reason to NOT value it. There are a million reasons to make concerns and values for yourself reflecting survival, biological or social. Take your pick: Familial, societal, emotional, desirable, ALL of the preceding contain a vast array of reasons to value survival. And there isn't a reason to NOT value it. And if one can find a reason, I would contend that they would need to explain why it is their reason for devaluing survival supersedes that of the reasons to value it.
TL;DR version
Moral values are subjective by definition, but this doesn't undermine the concept of objective morality in the slightest.
While I can't tell you why you objectively ought to value anything, I can give you a vast array of reasons why you should value some basic things societies need to value in order to survive, and if you're going to say that it's not enough, I would submit you'd be required to submit a valid and sound reason that supersedes all of mine to devalue survival if you're going to argue this point, otherwise it's moot.