lollollol12 wrote...
I FUCKED YOUR MOTHER.
I see that you mistook "paradox" for "stupid random bullshit" this is a paradox:
Hempel describes the paradox in terms of the hypothesis[1][2]:
(1) All ravens are black.
In strict logical terms, via the Law of Implication, this statement is equivalent to:
(2) Everything that is not black is not a raven.
It should be clear that in all circumstances where (2) is true, (1) is also true; and likewise, in all circumstances where (2) is false (i.e. if we imagine a world in which something that was not black, yet was a raven, existed), (1) is also false. This establishes logical equivalence.
Given a general statement such as all ravens are black, we would generally consider a form of the same statement that refers to a specific observable instance of the general class to constitute evidence for that general statement. For example,
(3) Nevermore, my pet raven, is black.
is clearly evidence supporting the hypothesis that all ravens are black.
The paradox arises when this same process is applied to statement (2). On sighting a green apple, we can observe:
(4) This green (and thus not black) thing is an apple (and thus not a raven).
By the same reasoning, this statement is evidence that (2) everything that is not black is not a raven. But since (as above) this statement is logically equivalent to (1) all ravens are black, it follows that the sight of a green apple offers evidence that all ravens are black.
I really like this one as well:
A judge tells a condemned prisoner that he will be hanged at noon on one weekday in the following week but that the execution will be a surprise to the prisoner. He will not know the day of the hanging until the executioner knocks on his cell door at noon that day. Having reflected on his sentence, the prisoner draws the conclusion that he will escape from the hanging. His reasoning is in several parts. He begins by concluding that the "surprise hanging" can't be on a Friday, as if he hasn't been hanged by Thursday, there is only one day left - and so it won't be a surprise if he's hanged on a Friday. Since the judge's sentence stipulated that the hanging would be a surprise to him, he concludes it cannot occur on Friday. He then reasons that the surprise hanging cannot be on Thursday either, because Friday has already been eliminated and if he hasn't been hanged by Wednesday night, the hanging must occur on Thursday, making a Thursday hanging not a surprise either. By similar reasoning he concludes that the hanging can also not occur on Wednesday, Tuesday or Monday. Joyfully he retires to his cell confident that the hanging will not occur at all. The next week, the executioner knocks on the prisoner's door at noon on Wednesday — which, despite all the above, will still be an utter surprise to him. Everything the judge said has come true.